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Abstract
With the advent of big data, unique opportunities arise for data collection and
analysis and thus for personalized pricing. We simulate a self-learning algorithm
setting personalized prices based on additional information about consumer sensi-
tivities in order to analyze market outcomes for consumers who have a preference
for fair, equitable outcomes. For this purpose, we compare a situation that does
not consider fairness to a situation in which we allow for inequity-averse consumers.
We show that the algorithm learns to charge different, revenue-maximizing prices
and simultaneously increase fairness in terms of a more homogeneous distribution
of prices.
JEL-Codes: D63, D91, L12
Keywords: pricing algorithm, reinforcement learning, Q-learning, price discrimi-
nation, fairness, inequity
1 Introduction
Determining the optimal price of a product or service for a particular customer is complex:
it requires knowledge of the customer’s willingness to pay, estimation of demands, ability
to adjust strategies to competition pricing, and more. With the advent of big data, unique
opportunities arise for data collection and analysis and thus for personalized pricing.
This paper discusses the capacity of reinforcement learning – a type of machine learning
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in which agents learn from interacting autonomously with their environment – to price
discriminate based on a simulation of a price-setting algorithm.1
In the context of the increasing use of big data and the use of price-setting algorithms, con-
cerns have been raised, besides the discussion about collusive behavior2, that self-learning
algorithms might engage in price discrimination3, as they are able to use information
about customers to segment them into ever-smaller groups based on certain characteris-
tics related to their willingness to pay. Reports about customers who had to pay different
prices for the same product or service have been published in the Wall Street Journal,
the Washington Post, and the German magazine Wirtschaftswoche.4 Consumers tend to
be very sensitive to such attempts, as they have a strong sense of fairness.5 This might
explain why price discrimination is still relatively rare in economic reality.6
This begs the question of whether it is possible for price-setting algorithms to learn to
engage in price discrimination on a basis of fairness, in order to avoid upsetting customers
but still maximize expected revenues by charging personalized prices. For this reason,
we will not only discuss the possibilities of algorithms to conduct price discrimination
but also the possibility of self-learning pricing algorithms to consider customers’ fairness
preferences while setting prices. If algorithms are able to consider inequity aversion while
setting differential prices, price discrimination is more likely to occur.7 However, the effect
of personalized pricing on consumer welfare is ambiguous. In many cases, personalized
pricing can be beneficial: for example, the ability to offer targeted discounts might help
new entrants to compete (especially in markets with switching costs) and could expand
output. On the other hand, in some situations, personalized pricing can lead to consumer
harm.8
Effective price discrimination relies on the identification of different customer groups. In
1 Simulations are programmed in Python.
2 For more details, see e.g. Ezrachi and Stucke (2015), Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), and Woodcock
(2017).
3 See e.g. Reinartz (2002) and UK Office of Fair Trading (2013).
4 On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels, in: Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2012; On the
Web, Price Tags Blur, Washington Post, September 27, 2000; Der Preis ist heiß, Wirtschaftswoche,
March 02, 2017.
5 Kahneman et al. 1986.
6 As stated, for example, by Odlyzko (2009), the Executive Office of the President of the United States
(2015), UK Office of Fair Trading (2013), and the UK Competition and Market Authority (2018).
7 This is also in line with growing public policy concerns; see, for example, Bourreau and Streel (2018),
the UK Competition and Market Authority (2018), and the Executive Office of the President of the
United States (2015).
8 According to the report of the UK Competition and Market Authority (2018), this is the case if
there is a lack of competition in the market; if discrimination is particularly complex or opaque to
consumers; or if consumers loose trust in the market and, as a result, withdraw their demand or
decline to participate in the market.
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each group, certain assumptions about price sensitivities must be made. For instance,
groups could be defined by customers’ location, communication channel, click behaviors,
or time spent on a certain website. The price sensitivities within each group should be
taken into account by the algorithm in order to maximize expected revenues. In the
two simulated scenarios studied here, we allow for differential pricing. We simulate an
algorithm setting personalized prices that does and does not consider customers’ notions
of fairness. For simplification, fairness is maximized if everyone pays the same price.
This equality-based fairness approach is widely used in the relevant literature, such as by
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Under this assumption, the
learning procedure of the algorithm should provide homogeneous prices among customer
groups while simultaneously taking into account the price sensitivities within each group
in order to maximize the expected revenue.9 Compared to the situation where fairness
is not considered, an improvement in fairness is seen in the situation where inequity-
averse consumers are considered, and the algorithm maintains the goal of maximizing
revenue.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short introduction into the main
concepts of price discrimination, fairness, and reinforcement learning. The methodology
is then presented in section 3, where the different groups of customers are introduced
and reinforcement learning is applied to the differential pricing problem. The simulation
results are presented and discussed in section 4. Finally, an outlook on further research
is provided in section 5.
2 Basic Concepts
2.1 Price Discrimination
In general, a firm engages in price discrimination when it charges different prices for two
units of the same or similar products, wherein the price difference does not reflect any
cost difference.10 Classic economic literature distinguishes between three types of price
discrimination.11 First-degree price discrimination occurs when the seller charges each
customer the maximum price that he or she is willing to pay.12 Even if firms do not have
enough information to assess each consumer’s reservation price, they can still conduct
imperfect price discrimination, which is known as third-degree price discrimination or
9 The algorithm has only a limited number of periods to learn the setting of the optimal price, as
customers are otherwise assumed to reject buying the product.
10 Stigler 1987.
11 Pigou 1920.
12 Varian 1989.
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group pricing. In this practice, sellers segment their customers into broad categories
according to observable characteristics; these categories are charged different prices. This
is probably the most common form of price discrimination.13
However, if firms are able to use information technologies to collect and process a large
amount of data, they can improve their knowledge of consumers’ preferences. As a result,
they might be able to refine the group segmentation, coming close to the ideal situation
in which each group consists of a single consumer. Thus, first-degree price discrimination
can be seen as an extreme form of group pricing.
First- and third-degree price discrimination rely on the existence of observable and ver-
ifiable indicators of consumers’ willingness to pay. When it is not possible to identify
customer groups with similar levels of willingness to pay, the only opportunity for offering
different prices to different consumers is to propose to all consumers the same menu of
packages (i.e., some combination of price and product characteristics), among which con-
sumers self-select. This practice is known as second-degree price discrimination, nonlinear
pricing, menu pricing, or versioning.14
Successful price discrimination requires the discriminating firm to have at least a small
measure of market power and an ability to segment their customers according to their dif-
ferent price elasticities of demand for goods or services.15 In addition, the firm must either
be able to prevent arbitrage or to exclude arbitrage due to certain product characteristics
(e.g. if the product or service has to be consumed directly). If these conditions are ful-
filled, the firm is able to increase its revenue by using discriminatory pricing strategies. It
should also be mentioned that a unit price can be a special case of price discrimination if
every customer has the exact same willingness to pay. Additionally, it is not possible to
charge every consumer a different price, as there is a smallest monetary unit and therefore
only a limited number of possible prices; therefore, there will always be some consumers
who pay the same price as each other.
In this paper, we focus on third-degree price discrimination. We define different customer
groups, wherein each group has different sensitivities – i.e., different acceptance probabili-
ties for the price bids of the firm. With the advent of big data, self-learning algorithms are
able to differentiate and segment customers into ever-smaller reference groups who have
similar price sensitivities and purchase behaviors and who share common biases and levels
of willpower. Pricing algorithms are able to use data on how other people in an individ-
ual’s group react in order to predict the individual’s reaction under similar circumstances.
13 Varian 1989.
14 Ibid.
15 Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
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This method enables the algorithm to adjust prices for products and services according
to the estimated willingness to pay; consequently, the more data the algorithm obtains,
the closer those personalized prices can be set to a consumer’s reservation price.16
2.2 Fairness
The fairness concerns of consumers have been a discussion point in economics at least
since the works of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Many
experiments have shown that economic agents do not just care about their own payoffs,
but rather also about the payoffs of others, and they act accordingly. Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) modeled fairness as inequity aversion, which means that people resist inequitable
outcomes and are willing to give up some material payoff to move in the direction of more
equitable outcomes. Thus, fairness or unfairness with regard to prices is evaluated by a
comparison to prices offered to other customers under similar circumstances.17 A way to
measure the fairness of a given distribution is provided by Jain et al. (1984), who take
into account consumers’ preference for equality, which drives similarly distributed – i.e.,
homogeneous—prices. The proposed fairness index is:
f(x) =
[
∑
xi]
2
n
∑
x2i
∈ [0, 1] , (1)
where f measures the fairness if resources are allocated to n individuals such that the ith
individual receives an allocation xi.
18 For the purpose of this paper, n is interpreted as the
number of customer groups, which are labeled by i. The variable xi can represent either
the price that is charged or the quantity that is sold to a particular customer group i. The
index measures the equality of the allocation x: if all consumers get the same amount or
pay the same price – i.e., all xi’s are equal – then the index is 1, and the policy is 100%
fair. If disparity increases, fairness decreases; a policy which favors only a selected few
consumers has a fairness index near 0. The index is dimensionless and independent of
scale; it is bounded between 0 and 1; and it is continuous, so that any slight change in xi
changes the index.
16 Ezrachi and Stucke 2016.
17 The approach of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) also includes the aspect of self-centered inequity aversion,
which means that consumers suffer more from inequality that is to their disadvantage (they have to
pay a higher price) than from inequality that is to their advantage (they have to pay a lower price).
However, for the sake of simplicity, we only consider a “general” inequity aversion.
18 Jain et al. 1984.
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2.3 Reinforcement Learning
As this study examines price discrimination and fairness through self-learning algorithms,
we introduce reinforcement learning as a basic machine learning concept. Reinforcement
learning is learning what to do, or how to map situations to actions so as to maximize a
numerical reward signal. The learning agent is not told which actions to take but instead
must discover which actions yield the most reward through trial. Reinforcement learning
uses the formal framework of Markov decision processes to define the interaction between
a learning agent and its environment in terms of states, actions, and rewards.19
One of the challenges that arises in reinforcement learning is the trade-off between explo-
ration and exploitation. To obtain a high reward, a reinforcement learning agent must
prefer actions that it has tried in the past and found to be effective in producing re-
ward. However, to discover such actions, it has to try actions that it has not tried before.
Therefore, the algorithm should use a dynamic action selection policy that balances ex-
ploitation (or choosing the optimal action as currently perceived) and exploration (or
choosing another action to improve action selections in the future.20
Independent Q-learning21 is a simple but well-established reinforcement learning algo-
rithm. Interacting with its environment, the algorithm learns according to a so-called
Q-function Q(s, a) that matches the optimal long-run value of choosing any action a ∈ A
facing any given state s ∈ S. During this interaction, the algorithm uses a dynamic
action selection policy that balances exploitation and exploration. The Q-function can
be represented as an |S| × |A| matrix. If the Q-matrix is known, the algorithm can then
easily calculate the optimal action for any given state. However, Q-learning is a method
for estimating the Q-matrix without knowing the underlying model through an iterative
procedure. Starting from an arbitrary initial matrix Q0, the algorithm chooses action at
in state st, observes rt and st+1, and updates the corresponding cell of the matrix Q(st, at)
according to the following recursive relationship:
Q(st, at)← (1− α)Q(st, at) + α
(
rt + δmax
a
Q(st+1, a)
)
, (2)
where the updated value Q(st, at) is a convex combination of the previous value Q(st, at)
and the reward obtained after performing action at in state st plus the discounted value
of the state that is reached in the following period. For all other cells of the matrix, the
Q-value does not change. The parameter α ∈ (0, 1) is the learning rate and δ ∈ [0, 1) is
the discount factor. Action a denotes the optimal strategy (i.e., the action leading to the
19 For a comprehensive introduction to single-agent reinforcement learning, see Sutton and Barto (2018).
20 Ibid.
21 Watkins and Dayan 1992.
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highest reward) until this time step.
To balance exploration and exploitation, the Q-learning algorithm adopts a probabilistic
action selection policy. Using what is called a ε-greedy strategy, the algorithm follows a
random action (exploration) within a given interval [amin, amax] with ε(t) ∈ [0, 1] prob-
ability and exploitative action with 1 − ε(t) probability. In the case of multiple actions
sharing the same highest Q-value under exploitation, the algorithm randomizes across
these actions.22
at =
[amin, amax] with probability ε(t)arg maxaQ(st, a) with probability 1− ε(t) (3)
The probability of exploration is determined by:
ε(t) = ε(0)(1− θ)t, (4)
where ε(0) ∈ [0, 1] is the initial exploration probability and θ ∈ [0, 1] is a decay param-
eter. Whenever θ > 0, the decay in exploration ensures convergence to a deterministic
strategy.
Although other more complex independent-learning algorithms (such as deep learning)
are currently being applied to diverse strategic settings, this paper focuses on a simple
Q-learning algorithm. In contrast to more sophisticated algorithms, this simple algorithm
can be fully described by just two parameters: the learning rate α and the experimenta-
tion parameter θ.23 A disadvantage of this algorithm is the slowness of learning, which
increases with the complexity of the environment. However, since the environment in this
paper is very simple, Q-learning provides an adequate approach for this problem.
3 Methodology
Customer groups gi with i = 1, 2, . . . , n are defined in advance. This can be interpreted
as an algorithm that divides customers into groups based on collected and analyzed data.
The characteristics used to classify customers must have an effect on their willingness to
pay. For the sake of simplicity, customer groups in this paper are exogenous. Therefore,
the processes of defining customer groups, allocating customers, and setting prices are
22 Approach based on Klein (2018).
23 For example, with deep learning algorithms, in addition to the learning and experimentation parame-
ters, one must specify a functional form for the Q-function, the number of estimation layers, and the
structure of the neural network in each layer.
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sequential.
Furthermore, we assume that customers are equally uniformly distributed in the interval
[0, 1]; thus, we assume a unit mass of consumers and unit demand. We start by defining
only two customer groups i = 1, 2 which can be expanded in later simulations. Every
customer belongs to exactly one group (either g1 or g2), and each customer responds to
each price bid with the following probability function φ ∈ [0, 1]:
φ(a) =
[
1 + e−(si+wi·a)
]−1
, (5)
where a is the action chosen by the algorithm (the price bid), and si and wi are parameters
defining the sensitivity of each group, defined in Table 1.24
Group s w
1 18.229 −23.69
2 4.4757 −15.526
Table 1: Weights for the probability function φ
The larger the parameter s is, the higher the acceptance probability of the customer
group. For s = 100, the acceptance probability equals 1.0 for any given price. For s < 10,
the acceptance probability for a price of zero is < 1. Parameter w determines how strong
and in which direction (positive or negative) the consumer reacts to a change in the price.
If w > 0, the customers’ acceptance rate increases with the price. This happens when
consumers judge quality by price. If w < 0, the acceptance rate decreases when the price
increases.
We provide a scenario simulating two different types of consumer behavior. Customers in
g1 accept much higher prices (also in terms of the initial acceptance rate) than customers
in g2. Both groups show a decrease in the acceptance probability if the price increases.
The acceptance probability functions of the two customer groups for the price interval
[0, 1] are shown in Figure 1.
The action space is defined as an interval for the action bid a ∈ [amin, amax] – i.e., the
price. Since Q-learning requires a finite action space, the action bid is a discrete variable
scaled between 0 and 1 with k equally-sized intervals; thus, actions are taken from a
discrete set A = {0, 1
k
, 2
k
, . . . , 1}.
The state space of group i is given by all prices that can be set for group j and vice versa.
Consequently, the state space is given by S = {0, 1
k
, 2
k
, . . . , 1}.
24 Similar functions were used by Maestre et al. (2019), who dealt with a more complex reinforcement
learning approach in a dynamic pricing context.
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Figure 1: Acceptance probability functions of customer groups g1 and g2
Whether a price distribution is considered fair is measured by the following fairness in-
dex:
f(a) =
[
∑
i amax − ai]
2
n
∑
i(amax − ai)2
, (6)
where amax is the maximum price that can be set (i.e., the maximum price of the given
action set) and ai is the price set for group gi. This index is based on the index of Jain et
al. (1984) shown in equation (1). Using the original index, a large and homogeneous value
of resources x increases the index and thus the fairness. However, in a differential pricing
context, large prices are not perceived as fair. With such an index modification, lower,
homogeneously-distributed prices lead to a higher fairness index. In order to consider the
consumers’ notions of fairness, the fairness parameter is integrated into the acceptance
probability function such that a low fairness index decreases the acceptance probability
and vice versa. The modified acceptance probability is given as:
φ(a) =
[
1 + e−(si+wi·a)+β(1−f(a))
]−1
, (7)
where β denotes a parameter for considering fairness (β = 1) or not considering fairness
(β = 0). The modified acceptance probabilities are shown in Figure 2 for different values
of the fairness parameter f .25
As customers are equally uniformly distributed within each group gi, the reward – i.e.,
the expected revenue – is defined as the price multiplied by the acceptance probability
25 Customers’ aversion to higher prices is captured in both the acceptance probability function (ac-
ceptance probability decreases with a higher price) and the fairness index (f is larger for lower,
homogeneously-distributed prices). Nevertheless, to see how fairness develops over time, it is neces-
sary to capture this feature as a separate consideration of the fairness index.
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Figure 2: Acceptance probability functions of customer groups g1 and g2 for different
fairness levels
from equation (7), where i = 1, 2 denotes the respective customer group.
ri = ai · φi (8)
The Q-learning is simulated as follows. In t = 1, the algorithm sets a price for each
group. For all subsequent periods, the algorithm sets prices alternately, wherein the last
price set for one group serves as the current state for the other group. Additionally, this
price serves as the comparative price for the fairness index. Depending on the selected
parameter values, the reward is either independent of the state (β = 0, if no fairness
is considered) or dependent on the current state (β = 1, if fairness is considered). The
algorithm learns to set the optimal price for each group by updating its Q-function for
customer group i according to the following recursive relationship:
Qi(aj, ai)← (1− α)Qi(aj, ai) + α
(
ri + δr
′
j + δ
2 max
a
Qi(a
′
j, a)
)
(9)
where action ai denotes the price set for group i and aj denotes the price set for group
j, which determines the state for the Q-function of customer group i. The updated value
Qi(aj, ai) is a combination of the previous value Qi(aj, ai), the reward obtained for group
i, the discounted reward r′j for group j that will be achieved in the following period, and
the discounted value of the new state a′j that will be reached in the following period.
The pseudocode for the Q-learning algorithm is provided below.
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Pseudocode Q-learning
1 Set probability function φ, parameters s, w, β, k, α, δ, ε(0)
and θ for group gi
2 Initialize Q1 and Q2 as empty matrices
3 Initialize a1,1 and a2,1 randomly
4 Initialize t = 2, i = 1 and j = 2
5 Loop over each period
6 | Set action bid ai,t according to (3)
7 | Calculate reward according to (8)
8 | Update Qi(aj, ai) according to (9)
9 | Update t← t+ 1
10 Until t = T (specified number of periods)
4 Results and Discussion
To constrain the number of possible actions, we use the discrete action set A = {0, 1
k
, 2
k
,
. . . , 1} with k = 10. Consequently, there are a total of eleven possible price bids. The
action set might be extended in further simulations.26 We consider two customer groups,
making i = 1, 2. We take an initial exploration probability ε(0) = 1, decay parameter θ =
0.000046, learning rate α = 0.1, and discount factor δ = 0.9. To assess the performance
of the algorithm, the statistics are computed over 100 runs. In each run, 100000 price
bids (periods) are simulated. Over these 100000 periods, the probability of exploration
drops to below 1%. For each period, we average over the 100 simulated runs to see how
an average market price and reward develop over time.
Two different scenarios are conducted in order to compare the outcomes of different
objectives. In the first scenario, the algorithm learns to set different prices for each
customer group. Fairness is not considered in this case, so the parameter β is set equal
to zero. Therefore, the acceptance probability simplifies to equation (5). The reward
is determined as ri = ai · φi. Since the fairness index has been dropped, the reward
of a chosen action does not depend on the current state (i.e., the price of the other
group).27 The corresponding action and reward history are shown in Appendix A. In
scenario II, fairness considerations are included (β = 1); thus, prices ai and aj depend
on each other, due to the fairness index. Customers are assumed to be inequity averse
– i.e., they have a strong preference for equitable, homogeneous prices. As a result, the
acceptance probability decreases with a decreasing value of the fairness parameter. The
26 A large action set negatively affects learning convergences; consequently, the algorithm would take
much longer to learn the optimal pricing strategy.
27 This simplified setting implies a one-stationary problem, which could be solved more efficiently by a
multi-armed bandit algorithm. However, for a better comparison, the Q-learning algorithm is also
applied in this case.
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reward is calculated the same way as in scenario I, with the only difference being that
the acceptance probability φ now depends on the fairness parameter f . Consequently,
the algorithm learns to increase the price within each group (maximizing the expected
revenue, as seen in the previous scenario) while reducing price differences between groups,
in order to achieve both maximum revenue and fairness. It is assumed that maintaining
a balance of price distribution among groups of customers leads to fairer prices, as these
prices are chosen by considering customers’ preference for equality. The corresponding
action and reward history are shown in Appendix B; the average prices of the two scenarios
are displayed in Figures 3 and 4.
The average market outcomes of both settings of the final 1000 periods are presented in
Table 2. In the first scenario, the Q-learning agent is able to conduct price discrimination
and does not consider fairness. Accordingly, the value of the fairness parameter is lower
than 1, since consumers are charged different prices. If inequity aversion is introduced
(scenario II), the price for group 2 remains nearly unchanged, while the price charged
to group 1 decreases. As a result, prices are more homogeneously distributed (although
there is no unit price), since the price-setting policy balances between maximizing revenue
and providing a fair market outcome. This is further illustrated by a higher value of the
fairness parameter than in scenario I. The higher reward is obtained in scenario I, where
prices are set on a discriminatory basis without considering fairness. However, the reward
obtained when setting differential prices while simultaneously taking customers’ inequity
aversion into account is just slightly lower than that in scenario I.
Hyperparameters Results
Scenario α δ k β ā1 ā2 r̄ f̄
I 0.10 0.90 10 0 0.636 0.204 0.742 0.874
II 0.10 0.90 10 1 0.599 0.204 0.740 0.900
Table 2: Parameter values and averaged results of the final 1000 periods
In order to compare the results of the algorithmic learning procedure with the analytical
solution of the profit maximization problem28, the market outcomes for both scenarios
are calculated. If fairness is not considered, it can be seen here that it is beneficial for a
monopolist to charge a price that is almost equal to the willingness to pay of customer
group g1 in order to extract as much consumer surplus as possible from this group. The
results of the analytical calculation are shown in table 3.29
28 Since we assume zero marginal cost, profit equals revenue in this case.
29 Because we only allow for numbers with one decimal place (in the case of k = 10), the simulation
results are not able to converge to the exact numbers of the analytical solution.
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Prices Profits (Revenues)
Scenario a∗1 a
∗
2 r
∗
1 r
∗
2
I 0.656 0.228 0.614 0.164
II 0.649 0.225 0.609 0.158
Table 3: Analytical solution
Certainly, this approach has some limitations. For example, the assumptions made above
do not reflect the economic reality. In a perfectly competitive market, price discrimination
is not feasible, as firms undercut each other until they end up in a (unit) price that equals
marginal cost. However, prices might be differentiated due to search costs, lock-in effects,
transportation costs, or asymmetric information. As a result, firms compete with each
other, but markets do not seem to be perfectly competitive, and differential prices are
likely to occur.30 Another assumption that applies in reality is that of a limited action
space: since firms have a price limit under which they would never sell the product
(typically under average or marginal cost) the price interval has a lower bound31, and the
upper bound of the price interval is potential customers’ maximum willingness to pay.
However, it should be mentioned that each customer’s actual willingness to pay cannot
be determined by firms, as they only obtain imperfect information about each consumer.
For this reason, personalized prices are not identical to perfect price discrimination.
Additionally, the implications of personalized pricing for consumer and total welfare are
ambiguous, welfare could move in many directions relative to the benchmark of a unified
market. Bergemann et al. (2015) showed that while obtaining additional information
about consumers can never hurt the seller, it can increase both total and consumer surplus,
decrease both, or increase one and decrease the other. Which form of market segmentation
is used in practice is influenced by many factors, which may include both technological
and legal limitations on how information can be collected and used. In our simulation,
customer group 2 benefits from fair personalized pricing since they pay a lower price, while
customer group 1 is worse off since they pay a higher price. With these specific numbers
and parameters, the decrease in consumer surplus of customer group 1 is higher than
the increase in consumer surplus of customer group 2. However, this distribution might
change if the values for s and w (which determine the acceptance probability φ) change,
30 Much empirical work tests for the presence of price discrimination in imperfectly competitive envi-
ronments, e.g. Shepard (1991) in the gasoline market, Goldberg (1995) in the market for European
automobiles, and Leslie (2004) in the Broadway theater market. For a survey of price discrimination
in imperfectly competitive markets, see Armstrong (2006).
31 Despite the willingness to obtain negative profits in particular situations, retailers in the EU are not
allowed to sell below cost (called predatory pricing) according to TFEU, Art. 102. The reason given
is that such behavior, exercised over a longer period, can drive smaller competitors out of the market.
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or if more customer groups with different acceptance probabilities are introduced.32 In
our setting, both the average market price and the expected revenue increase whenever
personalized prices are introduced. This is also in line with economic literature in the
monopolistic (single-agent) setting.
5 Further Research
Using reinforcement learning, this paper shows how to maximize prices while maintain-
ing a balance between revenue and fairness. Compared to the “standard” case of price
discrimination, the results show an improvement in fairness while also obtaining the goal
of maximizing revenue. However, compared to uniform pricing, the average market price
increases.
Future research might include possible extensions of this study. First, the parameters (ε,
f) could be refined in order to do justice to the complexity of this approach. For example,
Jain’s index does not account for self-centered inequity aversion, which occurs when people
do not care about inequity that exists among other people and are only interested in the
fairness of their own material payoff relative to the payoffs of others. According to Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), the judgment and feelings associated with advantaged and disadvan-
taged price inequality are different, because consumers suffer more from inequality that is
to their disadvantage (which is not considered in the current index). Second, the action
space and the state space could be extended to allow for more prices (an increase in k).
Additionally, more customer groups may be added. Finally, the comparison with other
reinforcement learning methods, such as deep learning, and with evolutionary algorithms
could be useful for obtaining further insights. The complexity of the algorithm might
also be increased by including the processes of defining and refining customer groups as
well as setting prices simultaneously. Using different algorithms might also allow for the
investigation of multi-agent learning by simulating a competitive environment instead of
a monopolistic structure, the outcomes of which are unclear in economic literature.
32 Dubé and Misra (2019) conducted an experiment with an online recruiting company, comparing the
existing uniform price, an optimized uniform price, and targeted prices. They found that customer
surplus declines slightly with personalized pricing relative to uniform pricing. However, over 60% of
customers benefit from personalized prices that are lower than the optimal uniform price.
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Figure 5: Action history scenario I
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Figure 6: Reward history scenario I
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Figure 7: Action history scenario II
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